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2013/01/31 : CIA-RDP90G01353R001400100004-6

From: John Helgerson

27 MAY 1988

       We plan to prepare an  
answer for your signature.

       We plan to prepare an  
answer for my signature.


       No answer expected or required

       John, I prefer to                     

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ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	NIO/EA		X		
18	D/OEA/DI		X		
19	C/EA/DO		X		
20					
21					
22			X		
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

D/OCA plans to prepare a response for his signature.

  
Executive Secretary

STAT

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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One Hundredth Congress

88-2249X

## Congress of the United States

## Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

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MINORITY CHIEF OF STAFF

May 24, 1988

The Hon. William Webster  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
McLean, Virginia

Dear Mr. Webster:

I would like to request that the National Intelligence Officer for Indochina arrange an intelligence community briefing for members of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and cleared staff on the current situation in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Cambodia. The Subcommittee is also interested in obtaining an assessment of what impact, if any, the recent changes in leadership in Vietnam may have on that nation's internal and foreign policies.

The briefing would take place on Thursday, June 2, at 10:00 am in room 2255 of the Rayburn House Office Building. Enclosed please find a list of questions which I would like to have covered in the briefing. If any additional information is needed concerning the briefing, please contact Dawn Calabia at 226-7801.

Sincerely,

  
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ  
Chairman

Subcommittee on Asian and  
Pacific

DCI  
EXEC  
REQ

L-231-15

**DRAFT QUESTIONS FOR BRIEFING BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (CIA, DIA, INR) ON THE CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA**

1. Is Vietnam seriously interested in getting out of Cambodia? If so, what is driving that objective? What are Hanoi's minimum conditions for a withdrawal of its armed forces? What post-withdrawal presence would Hanoi like to retain in Phnom Penh? To what extent is Cambodia policy a subject of controversy within the Vietnamese leadership? Do the recent changes in Vietnamese leadership indicate any substantial shift in internal or foreign policy?
2. What are the current views concerning the Cambodia issue of the Soviet Union, China, and the various ASEAN countries? In particular:
  - To what extent does General Secretary Gorbachev wish to end the Vietnam drain on Soviet resources, and what amount of political capital is he willing to spend to end it? Is Cambodia policy a subject of controversy in Moscow?
  - To the extent that movement toward a settlement is occurring, is China facilitating that process, obstructing it, or remaining neutral? Would China be willing to emasculate the Khmer Rouge as a fighting force, and thereby assuage Vietnamese concerns about a KR return to power? Is Cambodia policy a subject of controversy in Beijing?
  - What differences exist in ASEAN capitals about the prospects for a Cambodia settlement, the essential components of such a settlement, and on how to achieve it?
3. What are the views of the leaders of the three CGDK factions concerning the utility of seeking a political settlement? Is the KR willing to have its military forces weakened so that it cannot be the dominant power in a coalition government? What do we expect will be Prince Sihanouk's course of action in the near future? Has Vietnam indicated any willingness to sitdown with Sihanouk? In his discussions with the Heng Samrin regime, has the Prince had the support of the other CGDK leaders and of China?
4. What is the present military situation? What is the balance of forces of the five actors (Vietnam, DPRK, ANS, KPNLF, and KR)? How successful have the three CGDK forces been in attracting, training, and equipping recruits, and then inserting them into Cambodia? What are the strategies and tactics employed? Are there continuing KR attacks on ANS and KPNLF units? What is the Vietnamese-DPRK strategy in combatting the insurgency? Has the Heng Samrin regime had any success in building a fighting force that can defend against the CGDK forces in the event of a Vietnamese withdrawal in two years?
5. What is the political and economic situation inside Cambodia? Has Cambodia's food production fallen as a result of last year's drought and this year's bad weather? Has the Heng Samrin regime made any

progress in strengthening its rule and in winning Khmer hearts and minds?

6. What is the current status of the Khmer Rouge movement? Who are the effective leaders? What is their political and military strategy at this time? Is there serious conflict within the leadership? To what extent has the KR been able to mobilize new recruits? What is the basis of the appeal? How dependent is the KR on support from China? Is the majority of their army and cadre inside Cambodia? How extensive are their stockpiles of arms and munitions inside Cambodia which have been widely reported by the press?

7. What is the level of economic relations between the ASEAN countries and Vietnam, and between Japan and Vietnam? Is Japan taking a more active role in seeking a political solution in Cambodia? If so, why?

8. What impact, if any, would the establishment of a "US interests section" have on Vietnam's policy in Cambodia? Would it in anyway lessen or improve Vietnam's willingness to seek a negotiated solution in Cambodia that would involve an international peacekeeping force and internationally supervised elections?

9. Why does the Vietnamese economy continue to decline? how severe is Vietnam's recently announced famine and food deficit? Are people actually starving in the North? Is this an actual food production problem or is it lack of internal distribution? Has any international agency, such as WFP or the FAO, done an assessment of their food deficit, agricultural needs and their nutritional situation? How much food, fertilizer, insecticide have they requested? How much have the Soviets provided? Other bloc countries? What likelihood is there that if food was provided by the international community it would actually reach the people in need?